Trouble looks to be brewing in Somalia. The country is fractured politically, Al-Shabaab’s insurgency is back on the attack and foreign partners are questioning the wisdom of continuing to pump money into the dysfunctional federal system based in the capital Mogadishu. Ahead of national polls due by May 2026, the government plans to change the electoral model from an indirect system to universal suffrage, drawing stiff resistance from opposition politicians and two of Somalia’s federal member states, Puntland and Jubaland. Such divisions have in turn diverted Mogadishu’s attention from the war with Al-Shabaab, allowing the Islamist group to retake much of the territory the government captured in 2022 and 2023. External assistance, especially financing for the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which helps the government battle Al-Shabaab, is in decline or in doubt, further weakening Somalia’s defences.
Collapse is not imminent, but the status quo is increasingly shaky. The European Union, one of Mogadishu’s most important partners, can help shore it up. The initial two-year window for the Somalia-EU Joint Operational Roadmap concluded in 2025, providing an opportunity for Brussels to reassess its partnership. The EU should first help the federal government deal with the current challenges, but it should also urge Mogadishu to address the deeper political fault lines that the country has been unable to get past.
The EU and its member states can help Somalia by:
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Pressing Mogadishu to reach an agreement with the political opposition and federal member states over a framework for the 2026 polls, conducting shuttle diplomacy jointly with the AU and UN and preparing to mediate together if necessary;
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Announcing its contribution to AUSSOM in 2025 by the AU-EU summit in November and fast-tracking support for 2026 ahead of a conference Brussels is planning on Somalia early in the year, while revamping its security assistance missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to better plug gaps in Somali security capabilities;
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Assessing the shortcomings of the Somalia-EU roadmap, which the two sides committed to in 2023, and preparing a revised version that emphasises the need to address underlying political barriers to stability. As part of this effort, Brussels should press for sustained talks between the federal government and Puntland to bridge differences over how the country’s system of federalism should work.
Members of Somali special police forces stand in formation, after being trained and equipped by the EU, in a collaboration that aims to enhance safety and strengthen the fight against the threat posed by Al-Shabaab militants. Mogadishu, April 14, 2025. REUTERS / Feisal Omar
Wrangling over Elections
Somalia’s federal system, founded in 2012 to steer the country through its recovery from civil war, is getting ever creakier. The system is based on a central government in Mogadishu alongside a collection of seven member states with substantial devolved powers (Somalia considers Somaliland a member state, but it has declared independence and functions independently in practice). The member states in turn are responsible for local government, including maintaining their own forces such as police and hybrid military-police units known as Darwish. Foreign affairs, national defence, immigration and monetary policy are Mogadishu’s bailiwick. But the 2012 provisional constitution left the allocation of other executive powers to future negotiation between the federal government and member states – and after more than a decade, Somalia’s politicians have made little progress in divvying them up. Mistrust and political divisions between the centre and peripheries have hindered fluid working relations, making it more difficult to tackle the country’s many problems. The failure of Somalia’s political class to answer the perennial questions about the distribution of power and resources leads to heated disputes, particularly around the time of elections.
A case in point is the discord simmering as the 2026 polls draw near. In 2024, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud made reforms to the 2012 constitution, which included controversial plans to transform the country’s electoral model. Since the early 2000s, Somalia has held indirect elections, whereby clan elders select members of parliament, who in turn choose the president. In 2016, the elders began choosing electoral colleges to name the parliamentarians. Mohamud has proposed a shift to universal suffrage, but his critics argue that Somalia is not ready to expand the electorate so greatly, citing the practical obstacles to registering millions of voters in a country where vast tracts of territory are gripped by insecurity. At first, Mohamud also wanted the entire adult population to vote for president instead of having parliament choose the chief executive.
Opposition to the government’s plans is particularly strong in two quarters. Several political heavyweights, including two ex-presidents and three former prime ministers, are against the changes. They argue that the proposed new system would unfairly benefit President Mohamud, as his administration dominates most of the newly established institutions that would carry out the changes, including the electoral commission. They also worry that it could provide him with an excuse to extend his term while officials work to organise voting throughout the country. The other main dissenters are two federal member states, Puntland and Jubaland, which during previous elections exercised firm control of selection of the representatives they sent to Mogadishu. They wish to retain that power. They also believe that Mogadishu already has too much clout and would accrue even more with the reforms. Puntland, in particular, frequently clashes with what it sees as an overbearing central government. Mogadishu, for its part, counters that the authorities in Puntland demand too much autonomy.
The federal government is … pushing ahead with preparations for direct polls.
The federal government is nonetheless pushing ahead with preparations for direct polls. District council elections in Mogadishu are still scheduled for the end of October, while national polls are due by May 2026. In August, responding to the widespread criticism, the government made major concessions during discussions with opposition figures, including dropping the idea of a direct presidential election in favour of retaining the present system. Some opposition members have signed on to the revised plan, but others are holding out for further changes. They say Mohamud has not gone far enough in backing down from plans for a vote they regard as impractical. But they have put forth little by way of concrete alternatives.
Time is running out for the government and opposition to agree on a workable voting system if the elections are to proceed on schedule. If President Mohamud instead seeks an extension of his term, as his detractors suspect he wants to do, he would encounter even more intense resistance. Puntland and Jubaland are also likely to boycott balloting if their concerns are not addressed. Any attempt to push ahead with national polls where people in swathes of the country do not participate will deepen divisions between Mogadishu and the federal member states – and could lead to violence. Wrangling over the elections also leaves little space for other important reforms, including increasing the number of women in parliament, which is now languishing below the 30 per cent quota set out in Somalia’s electoral laws.
Gains by Al-Shabaab
The election dispute is hampering the government’s efforts to build a united front against Al-Shabaab, which has been fighting the government since 2007. The insurgency has made steady gains of late, taking advantage of the government’s political paralysis, the inexperienced, poorly trained national army and longstanding grievances among clans that undermine cooperation against the insurgents. In February, the group launched an offensive in the Middle Shabelle region in central Somalia, lands that the government and allied clan militias had taken in 2022-2023. In July, Al-Shabaab also pushed into Hiraan, the region to the north of Middle Shabelle, taking areas that had been under government control since 2014. A parallel offensive in Lower Shabelle, west of Mogadishu, raised fears that the capital could come under threat. A combination of government forces and Ugandan troops operating both bilaterally and under AUSSOM’s banner, supported by Turkish and U.S. airpower, beat back the insurgents in Lower Shabelle between August and October. Overall, however, Al-Shabaab’s battlefield position is better than it was at the beginning of the year.
The insurgency’s successes are unfolding amid a dramatic decline in international development and humanitarian spending, though these cuts are not directly linked to the government’s setbacks. Under President Donald Trump, the U.S. has led the way, allocating just $150 million for programming in Somalia in 2025, down from $770 million in 2024. Yet European countries that have heavily invested in Somalia’s recovery over the last two decades are also wondering whether their billions of dollars have been well spent, given the continued government dysfunction and Al-Shabaab’s advance. Mogadishu, which remains dependent on external assistance to fund its budget and security apparatus, is concerned that the resources will keep dwindling. Newer donors, such as Türkiye and Gulf Arab states, are carving out a larger role for themselves in Somalia but are unlikely to make up for the dropoff in Western aid.
Waning enthusiasm for Somalia is particularly apparent in AUSSOM’s difficulties in finding adequate funding.
Waning enthusiasm for Somalia is particularly apparent in AUSSOM’s difficulties in finding adequate funding. To date, the mission has secured only 27 per cent of its $166 million budget for 2025. The EU has underwritten stipends for African troops in Somalia to the tune of €2.7 billion since 2007, but its contributions have been dipping every year. Repeated calls from the EU on other foreign partners to give more have met with little success. Many hoped that the UN would cover much of the mission’s cost in 2025, but the U.S. did not back the requisite measure in the Security Council. Brussels has provisionally earmarked €60 million in the European Peace Facility (an EU fund to support military and defence capacities for partner countries, regional and multilateral organisations) for Somalia in 2025, but how this money will be split between the AUSSOM and the Somali National Army is unclear.
The AU mission is unlikely to pack up and leave, but the lack of full funding will hurt. Somalia’s neighbours, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya, are keen to keep their AUSSOM troops in place to ensure that Al-Shabaab does not threaten their own national security – and both also maintain their own independent forces in the country. But the anticipated budgetary shortfall will erode the mission’s capacity. It will also accelerate the trend away from a multilateral security framework to one based more on a set of bilateral engagements between Mogadishu and troop-contributing countries as Somalia seeks to patch over gaps. As a result, the total number of foreign troops in Somalia may not fall, but more of them will likely be operating outside the AU framework. The future will probably bring transactional agreements between Somalia and troop-contributing states, which are likely to be more volatile than the present arrangement.
What the EU and Its Member States Can Do
The election dispute, the related political wrangling, Al-Shabaab’s resurgence and the decline in foreign assistance are all unsettling the precarious status quo in Somalia. While the federal government has made a certain amount of progress in building its institutions over recent years, it has done much less to address underlying political problems that are primarily to blame for its continued fragility.
The EU has long been one of Somalia’s most steadfast partners, and the bloc enjoys strong relations with the current Somali government. EU representatives emphasise that its backing for Somalia comes in a wide range of forms, from humanitarian and development assistance to economic investment and stabilisation, mediation and budget support. For example, in 2020, its ambassador led a mediation effort that broke a deadlock over elections in Somaliland. The EU has also sponsored the deployment of two civilian and military CSDP missions to help the government fight Al-Shabaab and keep the peace in areas under Mogadishu’s control. In 2023, the Somali government and EU jointly developed a roadmap for their partnership through 2025, outlining shared objectives to reach in security, economic growth and inclusive politics. While there has been some progress, key targets – such as making the transition from the AU mission to Somali force deployment or achieving agreement on a definitive constitution – remain unmet. The roadmap’s two-year timeline expired earlier in the year, though it is still guiding the EU’s engagement in Somalia. But conversations in Brussels are now geared toward devising a fresh path forward for cooperation with Somalia.
As part of this process, the EU is reflecting upon which parts of the roadmap fell short and why. Time and again, the federal system’s failings have stemmed from divisions among Somalia’s political leaders. Of course, the EU cannot expect to overcome these entrenched differences through its donor programs. Nonetheless, what it can do is encourage Somali politicians to devote more time and attention to easing the underlying frictions – providing greater overall assistance if it sees progress and curtailing programming if it does not.
The first step should be to help broker a deal over the forthcoming elections. The federal government has not been talking with Puntland during the dispute, while its relationship with Jubaland remains troubled. The EU, in close partnership with the AU and UN, could jointly undertake intensive shuttle diplomacy to get the sides to the negotiating table and prepare to mediate between Mogadishu and the two member states if necessary. As these three organisations are the main partners in AUSSOM, which is the backbone of Somalia’s defence from Al-Shabaab at present, they have a vested interest in ensuring that the election dispute does not get out of hand. The EU can also leverage its strong relations with the federal government as well as its previous mediation experience to press the sides to design a workable system for holding inclusive elections. Meanwhile, Brussels should not let the immediate question of direct vs. indirect elections halt discussion of other much needed changes, like improving women’s participation in politics and the election system’s transparency. It should continue to engage with the federal government and member states to underscore the importance of these matters.
The EU should continue to support Somalia’s security apparatus, especially in light of Al-Shabaab’s advances since the beginning of the year.
Secondly, the EU should continue to support Somalia’s security apparatus, especially in light of Al-Shabaab’s advances since the beginning of the year. International partners should come up with a way of sustaining AUSSOM financially – without which Al-Shabaab will likely make further gains. Since the EU is the main financial contributor to the AU mission, an announcement soon from Brussels – ideally by the AU-EU summit scheduled for 24-25 November – as to the amount it is prepared to give in 2025 would provide reassurance and enable the mission to begin planning its next steps. The EU could also fast-track the process for determining its contribution in 2026, in line with a conference Brussels is planning to discuss Somalia and AUSSOM’s future. The EU has asked the AU to provide a list of military equipment and services that AUSSOM requires before it makes a funding decision, because a number of EU member states are wary of continuing to provide stipends. The AU has yet to hand over this list. In any case, it will be hard for the mission to immediately stop relying on the EU for stipend money, given the lack of other sources of financing for paying its troops. Instead, Brussels should work with the AU to come up with a phased plan for shifting its contribution toward equipment and services.
To complement AUSSOM’s efforts, the EU should also adapt its two missions – a military training operation and a civilian capacity building one – to boost Somali readiness to eventually take over the AU’s responsibilities. Efforts to prepare Somali forces have thus far been focused at the federal level, but local units under member state authority are also needed to hold the line against Al-Shabaab. The EU should include state police and Darwish in its training programs as well. The EU could also reorient its programs to focus on specific flaws in the workings of the Somali forces – such as command and control or logistics.
Thirdly, the EU should look to support longer-term change if it wants Somalia to stabilise and achieve core goals like eventually drawing down the AU mission. As noted above, one of the most important hurdles in the way of an effective national government has been political divisiveness and the threats it poses to stability.
The EU’s revised roadmap can make this point through a clearer focus on encouraging local dialogue. A good place to start would be bridging the gap between the federal government and Puntland, which would go a long way toward overcoming the blockages that prevent the federal government from functioning better, particularly as Puntland tends to be the staunchest defender of state autonomy in Somalia. While this discussion is likely to be lengthy, given the gulf between the government and member states as to how they should share power, the EU could call on the Somali government and Puntland to initiate a dialogue with the aim of translating the principles laid out in the provisional constitution – respect for executive powers in the central government’s domain, but also devolution of authority to the level where it will be most effectively exercised – into practical working arrangements. The government and Puntland could then bring other member states into the talks as they proceed.
Averting a flare-up of electoral unrest, addressing near-term security needs and devoting more energy to addressing the fundamental tensions that hinder progress toward a viable state will offer a better pathway to achieving long-term stability in Somalia. Through a refreshed roadmap, the EU can support Mogadishu as it seeks to get out of crisis mode and shift toward a more sustainable model of government. The war-weary Somali people deserve nothing less.
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