Somalia’s political fragmentation has allowed Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland to evolve into semi-autonomous power centers that negotiate foreign contracts, security arrangements, and political alliances with minimal transparency. While leaders present these moves as “development,” a closer look reveals something else entirely: foreign states and corporations gaining strategic access, and regional elites gaining political insurance, while the Somali public gains almost nothing.
Somaliland: DP World, Berbera Port, and the Recognition Game
Under President Muse Bihi Abdi, Somaliland has prioritized external partnerships to bolster its claim for international recognition. The most significant and well-documented example is the Berbera Port concession:
Documented Foreign Deal: DP World
- Company: DP World (Dubai, UAE)
- Deal: 30-year concession for Berbera Port (signed 2016)
- Partners: Somaliland + Ethiopia (Ethiopia given 19% stake in 2018)
- Add-ons: Berbera Free Zone + Berbera Corridor Road Project
DP World is a major global port operator seeking commercial and strategic leverage along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden maritime trade routes.
Supporters claim the deal brings investment. Critics argue it was negotiated without Somali national oversight, sidelines federal sovereignty, and lacks financial transparency. The average Somali in Hargeisa or Berbera sees limited improvement.
Puntland: Bosaso Port, UAE Security Forces, and the Parallel State Model
Puntland under President Said Abdullahi Deni has maintained deep connections with the United Arab Emirates, especially in ports and security.
Documented Foreign Deal: Bosaso Port
- Company: P&O Ports (Subsidiary of DP World)
- Deal: 30-year concession for Bosaso Port (2017)
The deal faced delays, financial disputes, and security incidents, including a 2019 attack targeting UAE port managers.
Documented Foreign Military Program: PMPF
- Funding: United Arab Emirates (UAE)
- Training Contractor: Sterling Corporate Services (SCS), formerly Saracen International
- Mission: Counter-piracy & coastal security
PMPF operates outside federal chain of command and created a parallel security structure loyal to regional authorities. UN Monitoring Group reports flagged the program due to arms embargo concerns.
Jubaland: Kenyan Security Umbrella and the Border Buffer Strategy
Jubaland under Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Ahmed Madobe) has leaned on security alignments with Kenya rather than port concessions.
Documented Foreign Military Alignment: Kenya Defence Forces
- Actor: Kenya Defence Forces (KDF)
- Mandate: Operating under AMISOM / ATMIS
- Region: Kismayo & border regions
Kenya treats Jubaland as a strategic buffer zone to reduce cross-border Al-Shabaab threats and secure political allies.
Three Regions, One Pattern: Foreign Sponsors, Local Gatekeepers, Public Excluded
Despite differences, Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland share a common political architecture:
- Foreign states gain strategic access
- Regional elites gain political insurance
- The Somali public gains nothing
Foreign companies and governments gain contracts, access routes, security footholds, and political influence. Somali elites gain survival. The public gains no transparency, no sovereign control, and no benefit.
Conclusion: Foreign Deals Are Not Development
Somaliland’s DP World concession, Puntland’s PMPF program, and Jubaland’s Kenyan security dependency are geopolitical transactions conducted above the heads of Somali citizens. Until Somalia moves from elite brokerage to public accountability, the country will remain economically fragmented, politically manipulated, strategically penetrated, and divided into port-sized pieces — and ordinary Somalis will continue paying the price.